In this paper, we aim to clarify and evaluate the contention that immortality would be necessarily boring . It will emerge that, just as there are various importantly different kinds of immortality, there are various distinct kinds of boredom. To evaluate the Necessary Boredom Thesis, we need to specify the kind of immortality and the kind of boredom. We argue against the thesis, on various specifications of “immortality” and “boredom.”.

The current ethical norms of genomic biobanking creating and maintaining large repositories of human DNA and/or associated data for biomedical research have generated criticism from every angle, at both the practical and theoretical levels. The traditional research model has involved investigators seeking biospecimens for specific purposes that they can describe and disclose to prospective subjects, from whom they can then seek informed consent. In the case of many biobanks, however, the institution that collects and maintains the biospecimens may not itself (...) be directly involved in research, instead banking the biospecimens and associated data for other researchers. Moreover, the future uses of biospecimens may be unknown, if not unknowable, at the time of collection. Biobanking may thus stretch the meanings of inform and consent to their breaking point: if you cannot inform subjects about what their biospecimens will be used for, what can they consent to? Given that informed consent by individual subjects is the ethical gold standard, the seeming dilution of the concept in the context of biobanking is a profound problem. (shrink)

Near-death experiences offer a glimpse not only into the nature of death but also into the meaning of life. They are not only useful tools to aid in the human quest to understand death but are also deeply meaningful, transformative experiences for the people who have them. In a unique contribution to the growing and popular literature on the subject, philosophers John Martin Fischer and Benjamin Mitchell-Yellin examine prominent near-death experiences, such as those of Pam Reynolds, Eben Alexander (...) and Colton Burpo. They combine their investigations with critiques of the narratives' analysis by those who take them to show that our minds are immaterial and heaven is for real. In contrast, the authors provide a blueprint for a science-based explanation. Focusing on the question of whether near-death experiences provide evidence that consciousness is separable from our brains and bodies, Fischer and Mitchell-Yellin give a naturalistic account of the profound meaning and transformative effects that these experiences engender in many. This book takes the reality of near-death experiences seriously. But it also shows that understanding them through the tools of science is completely compatible with acknowledging their profound meaning. (shrink)

G. E. Moore observed that to assert, 'I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don't believe that I did' would be 'absurd'. Over half a century later, such sayings continue to perplex philosophers. In the definitive treatment of the famous paradox, Green and Williams explain its history and relevance and present new essays by leading thinkers in the area.

This is a collection of papers presented at the Symposium "Are There are Laws of Biology?", in the 1996 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. It includes four separate papers: "Why Do Biologists Argue Like They Do?" by John Beatty, "Does Biology Have Laws? The Experimental Evidence" by Robert Brandon, "Two Outbreaks of Lawlessness in Recent Philosophy of Biology" by Elliott Sober, and "Pragmatic Laws" by Sandra D. Mitchell.

Genomic biobanks present ethical challenges that are qualitatively unique and quantitatively unprecedented. Many critics have questioned whether the current system of informed consent can be meaningfully applied to genomic biobanking. Proposals for reform have come from many directions, but have tended to involve incremental change in current informed consent practice. This paper reports on our efforts to seek new ideas and approaches from those whom informed consent is designed to protect: research subjects. Our model emerged from semi-structured interviews with healthy (...) volunteers who had been recruited to join either of two biobanks , and whom we encouraged to explain their concerns and how they understood the relationship between specimen contributors and biobanks. These subjects spoke about their DNA and the information it contains in ways that were strikingly evocative of the legal concept of the trade secret. They then described the terms and conditions under which they might let others study their DNA, and there was a compelling analogy to the commonplace practice of trade secret licensing. We propose a novel biobanking model based on this trade secret concept, and argue that it would be a practical, legal, and ethical improvement on the status quo. (shrink)

How do people gather samples of evidence to learn about the world? Adults often prefer to sample evidence from diverse sources—for example, choosing to test a robin and a turkey to find out if something is true of birds in general. Children below age 9, however, often do not consider sample diversity, instead treating non‐diverse samples (e.g., two robins) and diverse samples as equivalently informative. The current study (N = 247) found that this discontinuity stems from developmental changes in standards (...) for evaluating evidence—younger children chose to learn from samples that best approximate idealized views of what category members are supposed to be like (e.g., the fastest cheetahs), with a gradual shift across age toward samples that cover more within‐category variation (e.g., cheetahs of varying speeds). These findings have implications for the relation between conceptual structure and inductive reasoning, and for the mechanisms underlying inductive reasoning more generally. (shrink)

G. E. Moore famously observed that to assert ‘I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I do not believe that I did’ would be ‘absurd’. Moore calls it a ‘paradox’ that this absurdity persists despite the fact that what I say about myself might be true. Krista Lawlor and John Perry have proposed an explanation of the absurdity that confines itself to semantic notions while eschewing pragmatic ones. We argue that this explanation faces four objections. We give a (...) better explanation of the absurdity both in assertion and in belief that avoids our four objections. (shrink)

While rooted in careful study of Mead’s original writings and transcribed lectures and the historical context in which that work was carried out, the papers in this volume have brought Mead’s work to bear on contemporary issues in metaphysics, epistemology, cognitive science, and social and political philosophy.

For over forty years John Finnis has pioneered the development of a new classical theory of natural law, a systematic philosophical explanation of human life that offers an integrated account of personal identity, practical reason, morality, political community, and law. The core of Finnis' theory, articulated in his seminal work Natural Law and Natural Rights, has profoundly influenced later work in the philosophy of law and practical reason, while his contributions to the ethical debates surrounding nuclear deterrence, abortion, and (...) sexual morality have been a powerful, and controversial exposition of the practical implications of his theory of natural law. The Collected Essays of John Finnis brings together 122 papers. Thematically arranged, the five volumes provide ready access to his contributions across central areas of modern practical philosophy - the philosophy of practical reason; the philosophy of personal identity and intention; political philosophy; the philosophy of law; and the philosophy of revelation and the role of religion in public life. Fully cross-referenced, cross-indexed, and introduced by the author, the Collected Essays reveal the connections and coherence of the different branches of Finnis' work, showing the full picture of his philosophical contribution for the first time. Covering topics from the nature of divine revelation, the morality of abortion, to the adoption of Bills of Rights, the work in these volumes offer a unique insight into the intellectual currents and political debates that have transformed major areas of public morality and law over the last half century. Together with the new edition of Natural Law and Natural Rights, they will be an essential resource for all those engaged with the philosophy of law and broader questions in practical philosophy. (shrink)

This article challenges the generally accepted dogma that reliance is an essential ingredient in contractual formation. We argue that this view has resulted from an erroneous interpretation of the relevant case law, failure to cite contrary authority, and the elevation of often oblique judicial references to the need for reliance to the status of fundamental contractual principle. Contractual theory and clear policy reasons support our position that in English law a contractual obligation subsists when a person, knowing of a promise, (...) performs the stipulated act (or gives the promise) requested by the promisor, even though that person has not relied on the promise. (shrink)

Linear logic, introduced by Girard, is a refinement of classical logic with a natural, intrinsic accounting of resources. This accounting is made possible by removing the ‘structural’ rules of contraction and weakening, adding a modal operator and adding finer versions of the propositional connectives. Linear logic has fundamental logical interest and applications to computer science, particularly to Petri nets, concurrency, storage allocation, garbage collection and the control structure of logic programs. In addition, there is a direct correspondence between polynomial-time computation (...) and proof normalization in a bounded form of linear logic. In this paper we show that unlike most other propositional logics, full propositional linear logic is undecidable. Further, we prove that without the modal storage operator, which indicates unboundedness of resources, the decision problem becomes PSPACE-complete. We also establish membership in NP for the multiplicative fragment, NP-completeness for the multiplicative fragment extended with unrestricted weakening, and undecidability for fragments of noncommutative propositional linear logic. (shrink)

This book offers a thorough investigation into the development of the cognitive processes that underpin judgements about mental states (often termed 'theory of ...

Conducting or overseeing research in correctional settings requires knowledge of specific federal rules and regulations designed to protect the rights of individuals in incarceration. To investigate the extent to which relevant groups possess this knowledge, using a 10-item questionnaire, we surveyed 885 IRB prisoner representatives, IRB members and chairs with and without experience reviewing HIV/AIDS correctional protocols, and researchers with and without correctional HIV/AIDS research experience. Across all groups, respondents answered 4.5 of the items correctly. Individuals who have overseen or (...) conducted correctional research had the highest scores; however, even these groups responded correctly only to slightly more than half of the items. These findings emphasize the need for ongoing training in federal guidelines governing correctional research, particularly for those individuals who are embarking on this type of research. (shrink)

The rubric “The Late Derrida,” with all puns and ambiguities cheerfully intended, points to the late work of Jacques Derrida, the vast outpouring of new writing by and about him in the period roughly from 1994 to 2004. In this period Derrida published more than he had produced during his entire career up to that point. At the same time, this volume deconstructs the whole question of lateness and the usefulness of periodization. It calls into question the “fact” of his (...) turn to politics, law, and ethics and highlights continuities throughout his oeuvre. The scholars included here write of their understandings of Derrida’s newest work and how it impacts their earlier understandings of such classic texts as Glas and Of Grammatology . Some have been closely associated with Derrida since the beginning—both in France and in the United States—but none are Derrideans. That is, this volume is a work of critique and a deep and continued engagement with the thought of one of the most significant philosophers of our time. It represents a recognition that Derrida’s work has yet to be addressed—and perhaps can never be addressed—in its totality. (shrink)

§ 1. Introduction. Perhaps the most surprising recent development in complexity theory is the discovery that the class NP can be characterized using a form of randomized proof checker that only examines a constant number of bits of the “proof” that a string is in a language [6, 5, 31, 3, 4]. More specifically, writing ∣x∣ for the length of a string x, a language L in the class NP of languages recognizable in Nondeterministic polynomial time is traditionally given by (...) a polynomial p and a polynomial-time predicate P such that a string x is in L iff there is some string y satisfying P, where ∣y∣ ≤ p. Intuitively, we can think of a string y as a possible proof that x ϵ L, with the predicate P some kind of proof checker that distinguishes good proofs from bad ones. A string x is therefore in a language L ϵ NP if there is a short proof that x ϵ L, and not in L otherwise. The surprising discovery is that the deterministic proof checker that reads the entire input and proof can be replaced by a probabilistic verifier that on input x and possible proof y, where y is presented in a certain way, flips at most O coins and reads at most a constant number of bits of x and y. Obviously, a probabilistic verifier that does not read the whole proof will sometimes make mistakes. However, the surprising and essentially non-intuitive mathematical fact is that for each language L in NP, it is possible to find a polynomial q and verifier V flipping a logarithmic number of coins and reading a constant number of bits such that, for any x ϵ L, there exists y with ∣y∣ ≤ q and with V accepting with probability 1 and, for x ∉ L, there is no y with ∣y∣ ≤ q and with V accepting with probability ≥ 1/4. This idea canalsobeextended to PSPACE [10, 9], using a game that alternates between two players instead of a proof presented by a “single player.”. (shrink)

Mitchell, J.C. and E. Moggi, Kripke-style models for typed lambda calculus, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 51 99–124. The semantics of typed lambda calculus is usually described using Henkin models, consisting of functions over some collection of sets, or concrete cartesian closed categories, which are essentially equivalent. We describe a more general class of Kripke-style models. In categorical terms, our Kripke lambda models are cartesian closed subcategories of the presheaves over a poset. To those familiar with Kripke models (...) of modal or intuitionistic logics, Kripke lambda models are likely to seem adequately ‘semantic’. However, when viewed as cartesian closed categories, they do not have the property variously referred to as concreteness, well- pointedness or having enough points. While the traditional lambda calculus proof system is not complete for Henkin models that may have empty types, we prove strong completeness for Kripke models. In fact, every set of equations that is closed under implication is the theory of a single Kripke model. We also develop some properties of logical relations over Kripke structures, showing that every theory is the theory of a model determined by a Kripke equivalence relation over a Henkin model. We discuss cartesian closed categories but present the main definitions and results without the use of category theory. (shrink)

The Dartmouth Institute for Health Policy and Clinical Practice Atlas Project found “staggering variations” in the quality and quantity of end-of-life care provided to Medicare patients with severe chronic illness across the United States. Particularly concerning is the finding that more care is provided to patients who live in “high-supply” areas, irrespective of the effectiveness of care, and that more care often equaled inappropriate care that increased patients’ suffering at the end of life. Patients in “lower supply” areas typically received (...) better, more appropriate levels of care and reported higher levels of satisfaction with the care they received. (shrink)

_Becoming Human_ argues that human identity was articulated and extended across a wide range of textual, visual, and artifactual assemblages from the twelfth to the fifteenth centuries. J. Allan Mitchell shows how the formation of the child expresses a manifold and mutable style of being. To be human is to learn to dwell among a welter of things. A searching and provocative historical inquiry into human becoming, the book presents a set of idiosyncratic essays on embryology and infancy, play (...) and games, and manners, meals, and other messes. While it makes significant contributions to medieval scholarship on the body, family, and material culture, _Becoming Human_ theorizes anew what might be called a medieval ecological imaginary. Mitchell examines a broad array of phenomenal objects—including medical diagrams, toy knights, tableware, conduct texts, dream visions, and scientific instruments—and in the process reanimates distinctly medieval ontologies. In addressing the emergence of the human in the later Middle Ages, Mitchell identifies areas where humanity remains at risk. In illuminating the past, he shines fresh light on our present. (shrink)

Introductions should introduce, but sometimes lead to engagements. That is our aim. We want to make Plato’s Republic more easily read by modern readers, but do not want to do only that. For philosophy is like poetry, and cannot be learned second-hand. I can learn all sorts of facts about a poem, but unless I have entered into the poet’s experience, if only in my imagination, it remains dead. Similarly, I shall not see the point of text-book analyses of philosophical (...) doctrines unless I have felt the force of the arguments that led the philosopher to propose them, and have some sense of the objections he encountered and the way he sought to surmount them. That is why we still need to read Plato and Aristotle, as we do Homer and Sophocles, in a way that we do not, save as a historical exercise, read ancient textbooks of medicine or mechanical construction. (shrink)

In this work, I attempt a four-part task: to explicate Heidegger's notion of the Fourfold, to show its necessary relation to technology, to think the limit that separates these, and to show how this constellation of the Fourfold and technology escapes from the "metaphysics of presence" with which Heidegger has been charged. ;1. The Fourfold is the belonging together of Earth, Sky, Mortals, and Divinities. Heidegger inherits the components from Holderlin, but transforms then in his thought. The gathering of these (...) four goes to make up the presencing of a singular and delimited entity . Such a thing exists as unique and irreplaceable. ;2. This singular mode of presence is only understandable against the background of limitless technological circulation. Influenced by Ernst Junger, Heidegger sees technology as setting into place a world of instantaneous replacement and sameness. The name for this manner of replaceable presence is "Bestand ." ;3. The unworld of technology is no simple "opposite" to the Fourfold, however. Rather the two modes of presence belong together. Heidegger repeatedly emphasizes how there can never be a complete loss of world in the enframing of technology. Conversely, the Fourfold is never free of the Bestand. A play of revelation and concealment is operative here and intimately related to Heidegger's new notion of essence. I examine this intricate and intimate co-belonging of technology and the Fourfold. ;4. This interpretation is used to counter the charge that Heidegger would think in terms of metaphysical presence, i.e., in terms of complete, self-present, and pure presence. Such a charge is leveled in the early work of Jacques Derrida. I show that Heidegger's thinking is already a thought of the trace. Since there is consequently no total presence or absence for Heidegger , there can be no simple overcoming of metaphysics either. Metaphysics cannot be so easily left behind, but must undergo a transformation . This is nothing more than a recognition of the trace and its place at the limit of singular, finite existence. ;The first chapter treats the circulation of technology, the remaining four address in series the elements of the Fourfold. (shrink)

Deep neural networks (DNNs) have had extraordinary successes in classifying photographic images of objects and are often described as the best models of biological vision. This conclusion is largely based on three sets of findings: (1) DNNs are more accurate than any other model in classifying images taken from various datasets, (2) DNNs do the best job in predicting the pattern of human errors in classifying objects taken from various behavioral datasets, and (3) DNNs do the best job in predicting (...) brain signals in response to images taken from various brain datasets (e.g., single cell responses or fMRI data). However, these behavioral and brain datasets do not test hypotheses regarding what features are contributing to good predictions and we show that the predictions may be mediated by DNNs that share little overlap with biological vision. More problematically, we show that DNNs account for almost no results from psychological research. This contradicts the common claim that DNNs are good, let alone the best, models of human object recognition. We argue that theorists interested in developing biologically plausible models of human vision need to direct their attention to explaining psychological findings. More generally, theorists need to build models that explain the results of experiments that manipulate independent variables designed to test hypotheses rather than compete on making the best predictions. We conclude by briefly summarizing various promising modeling approaches that focus on psychological data. (shrink)